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The Hoplite was a heavy infantryman that was the central focus of warfare in Ancient Greece. The word hoplite (Greek ὁπλίτης, hoplitēs) derives from hoplon (ὅπλον, plural hopla, ὅπλα) meaning an item of armour or equipment and consequently the entire equipment of the hoplite (but not specifically the circular shield, which is sometimes incorrectly referred to as a hoplon, though it was in fact called an aspis). These soldiers probably first appeared in the late seventh century B.C. They were a citizen-militia, and so were armed as spearmen, and assumed a phalanx formation, which are relatively easy to equip and maintain; they were primarily drawn from the middle class, who could afford the cost of the armaments. Almost all the famous men of ancient Greece, even philosophers and playwrights fought as hoplites at some point in their lives.
Since the hoplites were a militia force and did not receive permanent wages, campaigns were short and mainly confined to the summer. Armies marched directly to their target. There, the defenders could hide behind city walls, in which case the attackers generally had to content themselves with ravaging the countryside (as siegecraft were undeveloped), or meet them on the field. Battles were usually set piece and intended to be decisive. These battles were short, bloody, and brutal, and thus required a high degree of discipline. Both forces lined up on a level field, usually in a rough rectangular formation around eight ranks deep (though this varied). Other troops were less important; hippeis (cavalry) generally protected the flanks, when present at all, and both light infantry and missile troops were negligible. The most well-known hoplites were the Spartans, who were trained from childhood to become magnificent warriors.
Equipment
Hoplites generally armed themselves shortly before battle because the equipment was so heavy - the total weight of the hoplites' armour was around 50-60 pounds (22-27 kilograms). Each man provided his own fairly non-uniform gear. As a result of the non-uniform gear friendly troops would often fail to recognise one another. A hoplite typically had a breastplate, a bronze helmet with cheekplates, as well as greaves and other armour, plus a bowl-shaped wooden shield called an aspis which was around 1 meter in diameter. The primary weapon was a spear around 2.7 meters in length called a doru.Hoplites also carried a sword called a xiphos.
By contrast, other contemporary infantry tended to wear relatively light armour, and were armed with shorter spears, javelins, or bows. Shields were usually smaller, or were large enough to cover the full body and rested on the ground. The middle-sized shield of the hoplite was made possible partly by its shape, which allowed it to be supported on the shoulder. In formation, the shields were overlapped so that each defended the left side of the soldier carrying it and the right side of his neighbour. While the general assumption is that the spear was gripped overhand, others have argued that it was held underarm.
Tactics
The strength of hoplites was shock combat. Two armies would smash into each other in hopes of breaking or encircling the enemy force's line. Failing that, a battle degenerated into a pushing match, with the men in the rear trying to force the front lines through those of the enemy. This maneuver was known as the othismos. Battles rarely lasted more than an hour. Once one of the lines broke, the troops would generally flee from the field, usually without being pursued. Casualties were slight compared to later battles, rarely amounting to more than 5% of the losing side, but the slain often included the most prominent citizens and generals who led from the front. Thus, the whole war could be decided by a single field battle; victory was enforced by ransoming the fallen back to the defeated, called the "Custom of The Greeks".
One of the early problems with the hoplite formation was the inability to march straight when entering combat. This was caused by the natural tendancy of the soldiers to press themselves as close to their neighbor (and thus his shield) as possible in order to be maximally protected. This was countered by Epaminondas of Thebes in the early 4th Century B.C. His innovation was to train his hoplites to march in a diagonal, so that when the formation entered combat, the diagonal march and the leaning tendency cancelled out so they did not veer off course. Before this time, only the Spartans had successfully maintained (almost) straight formations, and only due to years of training.
Rise and fall
The rise and fall of hoplite warfare was intimately connected to the rise and fall of the city-state. During the Persian Wars, hoplites were often forced to run towards archers in order to engage them in a melee where they would have the upper-hand, and during the Peloponnesian War light, projectile-armed troops such as peltasts became increasingly dominant. As a result, they began wearing less armour, carrying shorter swords, and in general adapting for greater mobility. However, hoplite warfare was in decline; there were three major battles in the Peloponnesian War, and none proved decisive. Instead there was increased reliance on navies, skirmishers, mercenaries, city walls, siege engines, and non-set piece tactics. These reforms made wars of attrition possible and greatly increased the casualties of battle. Many of them were combined by the brilliant general Epaminondas, whose tactics formed the basis for the Macedonian phalanx of Philip II of Macedon, used as a back-up to his cavalry. These forces defeated the last major hoplite army, at the Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC), after which Athens and its allies joined the Hellenistic empire. These developments led to the rise of the more versatile combined arms tactics of the Ancient Macedonians.
Legacy
Hoplite-style warfare was also practiced around the Mediterranean basin. Of particular note, the Etruscans usually fought with such militias, a practice they adopted from the Greek colonies. From this sort of warfare developed the Roman legion that was to dominate western military history for hundreds of years.
Pezhetairoi
The Pezhetairoi (Greek πεζέταιροι) were the backbone of the Macedonian army. They were Foot Companions (in Greek the "Pezos" means foot warrior, infantryman, and the "Hetairos" is the companion or friend).
The Greek phalanxes were made up almost entirely by pezhetairoi. Pezhetairoi were especially effective against enemy cavalry, as their long pikes could be used to impale enemies charging on horse-back. During Alexander's war with Persia, a need for cavalry arose, so mounted companions also started appearing around this time.
Description
The pezhetairoi were the battalions of the Macedonian phalanx. They first came to prominence during the reign of Philip II, particularly when they played such an important role in Philip's subjugation of Greece at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC.
The pezhetairoi were armed with the sarissa, a long spear with a shaft made from flexible cornel wood, which had a much longer reach than the traditional hoplite spear. Because of its length the phalanx could present the spearpoints of around five files of men; which made the phalanx almost impenetrable, and fearsome to oppose.
Tactically, the pezhetairoi were best used as a strong defensive line, rather than as shock troops. The length of the sarissa, while making them an awesome enemy to oppose, severely limited their manoeuvrability, and if they were taken in flank or rear they had little chance of responding. This was particularly clear at the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC, when the rapid advance of the right wing caused a breach to open between two of the battalions of pezhetairoi—a force of enemy cavalry broke through and, had it not been for a lack of discipline in their own command, and for Alexander's placing of a second line of traditional hoplites in reserve, the phalanx might have been destroyed from the rear.
Apart from in pitched battles the pezhetairoi and their sarissas were not very practical; it is supposed that they were re-armed, and their tactics adapted, to suit the guerrilla warfare that was prevalent, and necessary, in Bactria and Sogdia.
Pezhetairoi Battalions
The battalions of pezhetairoi appear to have been organised on a regional basis, at least to begin with. We know of battalions named for the regions of Orestis/Lyncestis (two battalions probably combining men from both regions), Elimaea and Tymphaea—if all pezhetairoi were from Upper Macedonia then we would expect the other battalions to have represented Eordaea and Pelagonia. In 334 BC Alexander the Great took six battalions of pezhetairoi with him to Asia. By the time the army moved into India in 327 BC a seventh battalion had been added.
At the Battle of the Granicus the battalions were those of (from right to left): Perdiccas, Coenus, Amyntas, Philip, Meleager, and Craterus (A 1.14.2).
At the Battle of Issus the battalions were those of (from right to left): Coenus, Perdiccas, Craterus, Meleager, Ptolemy (replacing Philip), Amyntas (A 2.8.3-4).
At the Battle of Gaugamela the battalions were those of (from right to left): Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Polyperchon (replacing Ptolemy), Simmias (deputising for Amyntas, who was recruiting in Macedonia), Craterus (A 3.11.9-10).
At the Battle of the Hydaspes River only five battalions took part, and were those of (from right to left): Antigenes, Clitus the White, Meleager, Attalus, Gorgias. The other battalions (those of Polyperchon and Alcetas) remained on the western bank of the Hydaspes, under the command of Craterus, and crossed only when Alexander was victorious, in order to continue with the pursuit of the fleeing Indians. (There is much supposition and guesswork about this battle, however—see J.F.C. Fuller, 1957, pp.180-199.)
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